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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PIONEER FINANCE & THRIFT 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
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DAHL RAY POWELL and 
BONNIE RAE POWELL, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants 
Case No. 
11133 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN 
GENERAL 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF FAILS TO OVER-
COME THE DEFENSE AGAINST COLLECTION 
OF THE POWELLS' NOTE AS THOSE DE-
FENSES ARE SET FORTH IN THEIR BRIEF 
IN CHIEF. 
The Powells' Brief in chief asserts four sepa-
rate substantive law defenses against collection of 
their note by Respondent, Pioneer. These are: AR-
GUMENT TWO, Fraud in the Inducement; ARGU-
MENT THREE, Failure of Pioneer to Act in Good 
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2 
Faith and Avoid Unconscionable Contracts; ARGU. 
MENT FOUR, Failure of a Condition Precedent· 
and ARGUMENT FIVE, Lack or Failure of Con: 
sideration. 
It is the Powells' hope that this Court will find 
for them on all four grounds. However, a valid de. 
fense against collection of the note by Pioneer is 
stated in each of the foregoing substantive law de· 
fenses or any combination of them. 
The Powells' Brief in chief cites many cases 
where courts found that buyers were not required 
to repay money they had borrowed from finance com. 
panies to purchase goods which the seller of the goods 
failed to deliver to the buyer. In these cases, the 
courts found that the finance companies were not 
holders in due course, even though the paper had 
been negotiated to them or purchased by them for 
value because those courts also found that those 
finance company claimants had been put on notice 
of, or were implicated in a fraud being perpetrated 
by the seller. 
To assume that those cases are relevant here 
only if this Court also finds Pioneer guilty of fraudu· 
lent participation in Stanley's scheme widely misses 
their legal impact. Such a finding of fraud on Pio· 
neer's part is by no means necessary to make the 
cited cases relevant to this case. 
Pioneer is not a holder in due course. Pioneer 
has the status of a "non-holder", not because of fraud 
on its part, but simply because Pioneer is a "direct 
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party" in the contract with the Powells. Pioneer is 
not a purchaser for value, nor has the note on which 
it sues been negotiated. Pioneer is not a holder in 
due course by definition and as a matter of law. 
This Court's decision in Scow v. Guardtone, 18 
Utah 2d 135, 417 P. 2d 643 ( 1966) is illustrative 
of cases where courts have deprived lenders of holder 
in due course status by a finding of fraud or knowl-
edge on their part. The Plaintiff in Scow, Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan, claimed to be an innocent 
purchaser for value of Scow's conditional sale con-
tract from Guardtone. Though a conditional sale 
contract is not a negotiable instrument, yet by virtue 
of Section 70A-9-206 of the Utah Uniform Commer-
cial Code (or its predecessor in the NIL) an innocent 
purchaser for value of a conditional sale contract is 
clothed with substantially all the attributes of a 
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. 
There was no question in Scow whether Guard-
tone delivered the goods to Scow nor whether Pru-
dential was a purchaser for value of the Scow con-
tract. The nub of the question posed to this Court 
in Scow seems to have been whether Prudential was 
"innocent." For the various reasons cited in that 
opinion, this Court found that Prudential was suf-
ficiently careless or involved in Guardtone's fraud as 
to strip of its "innocent" purchaser status. 
Once this Court had decided Prudential was not 
entitled to the extraordinary protection provided for 
an innocent purchaser, the result was that Pruden-
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tial could not prevail in its collection suit against 
Scow, however, no finding of knowledge or fraud 
on the part of Pioneer is needed in this case to con. 
fer on the Powells all of the legal defenses here as-
serted by them as provided by the rules of ordinary 
contract law. 
The lack of understanding of the cases cit€d 
in the Powells' brief in chief is illustrated by Re-
spondent's Brief where at page 13 it states: 
"Defendants' cases cited in their brief such as 
Commercial Credit Corp. vs. Orange County 
Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d819, 
and Mutual Finance Company vs. Martin, 63 
So. 2d 649, 44 ALR 2d 1, are not pertinent to 
the instant matter. In those cases the financ-
ing institution was found to have participated 
in the transaction (the sale) to the extent that 
the court held they were not a holder in due ' 
course of the paper which they purchased." 
Respondent fails to make the further inevitable 
legal conclusion that since the finance companies 
in the above cases were found not to be holders in 
due course (because of their fraudulent participa· 
tion) those finance companies were thereby placed 
in the same boat in which Pioneer now finds itseli 
because Pioneer also is not a holder in due course by 
definition. 
Respondent's brief at page 14 states: 
"In cases where contracts or notes have been 
sold or assigned, the courts have held t~at thde 
financing institution must have acted m ba . 
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5 
faith in order that the defense of failure of 
consideration or of fraud in the inducement 
prevail against them." [emphasis added] 
We agree. Where instruments have been sold 
or assigned, fraud or bad faith must be found to 
deprive note owners of the special protection provided 
for holders in due course, against the defenses of 
failure of a condition precedent, or failure of con-
sideration. 
In the course of making its argument that estop-
pel should be invoked against the Appellants, Re-
spondent cites Thorp Finance Company v. LeMire, 
264 Wis 220, 58 NvV 2d 641, 44 ALR 2d 189 ( 1953) 
as authority for the proposition that since the debtors 
signed a paper acknowledging that the merchandise 
promised by the seller was already in the buyers' pos-
session, the buyers were es topped to assert failure of 
consideration to defend against the finance company 
suit on its note. This interpretation of LeMire seems 
to be at variance with what the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court actually said at 44 ALR 2d 195: 
"The trial court made a statement in the rec-
ord after counsel for the plaintiff had moved 
for a directed verdict explaining the court's 
reasons for granting such a motion. In such 
statement the trial court declared that it would 
be a violation of the parol evidence rule to 
permit LeMire to prove that the furniture be-
ing purchased by him from Stoltz had never 
been delivered when the contract itself recited 
such delivery. [emphasis added] 
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"The learned trial court was in error in his 
conclusion that the parol evidence rule would 
preclude LeMire from proving the non-deliv. 
ery of the furniture ... " 
Pioneer even admits at page 20 of its Brief that 
"it is unlikely that Plaintiff relied on the literal 
language" of the Chattel Mortgage to the effect that 
the furniture was in possession of the Powells, but 
asserts it did rely on representations that the loan 
was to purchase the furniture on Stanley's list. What 
did happen? Pioneer's check was endorsed by Mr .. 
Powell and delivered to Stanley's agent in Pioneer's 
office in the presence of Pioneer's personnel (see Def. 
Dep. p. 17-18) to pay for the furniture on Stanley's 
list, which furniture was also listed on the Chattel 
Mortgage. Also at page 13 of its brief, Pioneer states 
that the check was made payable to Stanley "to in· , 
sure that the funds were actually used for the in· 
tended purpose." Pioneer cannot now assert it did not 
intend to have Stanley receive their check. 
Respondent seems to feel its position is strength· 
ened if it can establish that Stanley's promise to de· 
liver the furniture was somehow in the "indefinite 
future" (Respondnt's Brief, p. 6). That the Powells 
expected the furniture to be delivered immediately 
after they delivered Pioneer's check to him is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that they made numerous 
requests for the furniture (Def. Dep. p. 25) during 
the six or seven week period which intervened be· 
tween signing the note and posting of the bankrupt· 
cy notices on the Stanley Furniture Company door. 
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In view of all the legal and equitable circum-
stances involved in this case, Appellant vigorously 
resists Respondent's request for attorney's fees on 
this Appeal and on the contrary, asks that their own 
be paid by the Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF TO RESPONDENT'S 
CROSS-APPEAL 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
RULING THAT RESPONDENT HAD FAILED 
TO STATE A CLAIM OF FRAUD AGAINST THE 
APPELLANTS WHICH W 0 UL D BAR DIS-
CHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE FED-
ERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT. 
Section 17 (b) (2) of the Bankruptcy Act [11 
U.S.C. 35 (a)] provides that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy will release a bankrupt from all his prov-
able debts except such debts as: 
" ( 2) are liabilities for obtaining money or 
property by false pretenses or false represen-
tations or obtaining credit upon a materially 
false statement respecting his financial con-
dition or caused to be made or published in 
any manner whatsoever with intent to de-
ceive ... " [emphasis added] 
The United States Supreme Court interpreted this 
section of the Bankruptcy Act in Gleason v. Thaw 
236 US 558, 35 S Ct 287, 59 Led 717, which is also 
quoted at 133 ALR 436 stating as follows: 
". . . It does not except from discharge debts 
created by obtaining credit through conceal-
ment of insolvency and present inability to 
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pay. It excepts from discharge 'Liabilities for 
obtaining money or property by false pretenses 
or false representations.' Within the mean-
ing of that statute then, there were no false 
pretenses, no false representations here. There 
was merely the obtaining of credit witho1lt 
full disclosure, with the knowledge that if full 
disclosure had b(en required, credit might well 
not have been given, but that was all. A reme-
dial statute, like that of bankruptcy intended 
for the relief of debtors, must, insofar as 
denial of discharges and therefore of relief 
be construed strictly so that all debts except , 
those coming exactly within the exception will 
stand discharged.'' [emphasis added] 
In an annotation titled "What constitutes false 
representations in application for loan within provi-
sion of Bankruptcy Act rendering liability for obtain-
ing money by false pretenses or representations non- : 
dischargeable" the following summary statement will 
be found at 17 ALR 2d 1209: 
"The reported decisions make it clear that, if 
§ 35 of the Bankruptcy Act is to prevent a 1 
bankrupt's discharge from liability for a loan, 
the latter must be shown to have secured the 
loan by false representations of such character 
as to meet the judicial requirements for legal 
fraud - that is, the bankrupt's represent~­
tions must have been material and false JD 
fact must have been made with an intent to dec~ive and defraud, and the creditor must 
have believed, acted, and relied upon them to 
its prejudice. The representation must be of 
an existing fact or circumstance, not merely a 
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promise or statement of intention ... " [em-
phasis added] 
In amplification of the elements which must 
be proved in Utah to constitute the offense of ob-
taining money by false pretenses [76-20-8 UCA 
(1953)] this Court in State v. Timmerman 88 U 
481, 478, 55 P 2d 1320, 56 P 2d 1354 lays down the 
following rules of proof which are required: 
"Under this section [ 7 6-20-8 U CA] the fol-
lowing elements and proof of them must con-
cur, viz. : ( 1) There must have been false or 
fraudulent representations or pretenses; (2) 
the representations must have been made 
knowingly and designedly; (3) there must 
have been a concurring intent to cheat or de-
fraud the person to whom the false or fraudu-
lent representations or pretenses were made; 
( 4) something of value must have been ob-
tained because of the false or fraudulent rep-
resentations or pretenses; and ( 5) the party 
to whom the false or fraudulent representa-
tions or pretenses were made must have parted 
with something of value in reliance upon the 
false or fraudulent representations or pre-
tenses, believing them to be true." [emphasis 
added] 
Pioneer makes much in its Brief and Cross Ap-
peal of a play on words to the effect that the Appel-
lants deceived the Respondent in that the Powells 
represented to Pioneer that they were borrowing 
money in the amount shown on Stanley's handwritten 
list to pay for the furniture on that same handwrit-
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ten list when in fact, according to Pioneer, the 
Powells really only "loaned" the money to Stanley 
on Stanley's promise to give them "free" the furni-
ture he listed. 
While Pioneer's Brief recites some indication 
from the deposition that there was some confusion, 
particularly in the mind of Mrs. Powell as to the 
difference between buying and paying for furniture 
and lending money in return for getting furniture 
"free," further reading of the deposition leaves no 
doubt that Mr. Powell thought he was borrowing the ' 
money from Pioneer to buy the furniture on Stanley's 
list. 
Pioneer's Brief at page 7 recites the following 
answer given by Mr. Powell: 
"A. Well, the way he [Stanley] told us thathe 1 
was borrowing money on our credit and in 
return he was giving us the furniture for him 
lending us his credit or him using our credit." 
If the questions and answers immediately fol· 
lowing the foregoing (Def. Dep. p. 26) had also been 1 
quoted, additional light would have been shed on 
Mr. Powell's understanding of the transaction: 
"Q. You didn't really feel like you were buying 
furniture? 
"A. Yes, we thought we were buying furni· 
ture. 
"Q. And what did you expect to do in the even~ 
Stanley wasn't able to pay for the furniture. 
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"A. Well, I figured we would pay for the 
furniture as long as we had the furniture if 
he didn't make the payments. [The Powells' 
intention to pay if Stanley failed to pay is 
also asserted in their Deposition on page 38.] 
"Q. So it would be correct to say that you 
thought you were purchasing furniture? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And that in any event if Stanley could 
not make the payments you intended to make 
the payments? 
"A. Yes, that's right. 
"Q. Did it ever occur to you that maybe Stan-
ley might not deliver the furniture to you? 
"A. No, it didn't. We was going mostly by our 
friend. [David Hunt] He was the one that got 
us in on the deal and I knew him all my life 
and trusted him and he had received his fur-
niture and Stanley had made all the payments 
on it and if Stanley had come up on the street 
and told me of such a deal I wouldn't have 
gone for it but where my friend got me into 
it I fell for it." 
Mrs. Powell also seemed to consider she was 
borrowing the money to pay for the furniture on 
Stanley's list as shown by the following exchange 
(Def. Dep. p. 37) : 
"Q. Mrs. Powell, it was your understanding, 
was it, that you were buying furniture from 
Mr. Stanley? 
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"A. We was receiving some furniture, yes. 
"Q. And that you were borrowing money from 
the finance company to pay for that furni. 
ture? 
"A. Yes, and that he would be making the 
payments." 
That there was no intention on the part of the 
Powells to defraud Pioneer is further made clear by 
the fact that they paid over to Pioneer the money for 
a payment they received from Stanley. It seems un- . 
likely they would have paid over his money if they · 
had intended to defraud Pioneer. Their lack of in-
tention to defraud is further made clear by the 
fact that in their deposition the Powells reaffirmed 
the truthfulness of the financial statement they sub-
mitted to Pioneer and on which Pioneer relied in 
making the loan. 
Much is made of the fact that the Powells failed 
to tell Pioneer about Stanley's promise to make the 
payments. Though the Powells did not know why 
Stanley advised them not to tell Pioneer they cer· 
tainly did not think their failure to tell of Stanley's 
program was in any way fraudulent or harmful to 
Pioneer. 
At page 10 of the Powells' Deposition the fol· 
lowing colloquy between Mr. Swan and Mr. Powell 
will be found: 
"Q. Did you feel at this time that there w~s 
anything morally wrong or illegal about this 
deal? 
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"A. Well, No. 
"Q. You felt if someone would pay off this 
note and chattel mortgage and you can get 
free furniture for it, why no one's hurt, is 
that right? 
"A. Right." 
In the colloquy which then ensued, it developed 
that Mr. Powell had made numerous loans from fi-
nance companies, and that he was familiar with pro-
cedures and the time usually required for him to 
secure a loan. At page 20 of his deposition, Mr. 
Powell states: 
"Q. So you were pretty well familiar with their 
procedure? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And it is on that basis that you say this 
loan went through in a shorter span of time? 
"A. Yes. Before we have went to a finance 
company and filled out information and we 
have had to wait a day or so before they would 
tell us whether our loan was 0.K. before we 
even went there." 
In Defendants' Deposition p. 32, Mrs. Powell 
clearly states that she thought the finance company 
already knew about Stanley's arrangement: 
"Q. (By Mr. Swan) When he [Stanley] cau-
tioned you that way did that bother you? 
"A. Yes, it did. 
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"Q. Up to that point had you assumed that he 
and th~ finance company knew exactly what 
wasgomgon? 
"A. I think they did. 
"Q. After that time did you begin to wonder if 
the finance company knew exactly what was 
. ? gomgon. 
"A. Well, like my husband said, that was the 
shortest loan we have ever had taken out be-
cause others, they have really checked us but 
this one they didn't to our knowledge. 
"Q. At the one time he said to you 'Don't tell 
the finance company that I am making the 
payments,' wasn't that a red flag to you that 
the finance company didn't have the whole 
story? 
"A. Well, yes, but on the other hand our friend 
[David Hunt] said that some finance com-
panies did know what was going on. He didn't 
name any finance companies specifically but 
he said there was some of them that did know." 
Actually, the Powells made no false representa-
tions or pretenses to the Respondent. It is true that 
they did not discuss the fact that they intended to , 
receive money from Stanley to make the payments 
but the law seems clear that merely failure to dis-
close information which is not asked for cannot con-
stitute a false pretense or representation except pr,r-
haps in a fiduciary relationship. It seems clear also 
from the pleadings, the Affidavit of Pioneer's Man· 
ager, and from the Deposition, that Respondent re· 
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lied in rnakin,g the loan on the written and oral credit 
information supplied by the Appellants, the truth 
of which credit information was reasserted in the 
Depositions and has never been challenged by Pio-
neer. Respondent cannot now be sustained in its 
assertion that it relied in making the loan on Appel-
lants' failure to advise them that Stanley had agreed 
to supply the funds for the payments. 
The simple fact is that Pioneer bargained for 
and received a note signed by the Powells in reliance 
on the Powells' credit statement, but since Pioneer 
is not a holder in due course, failure of Stanley to 
deliver the furniture is a defense under contract law 
against Pioneer's collection of the Note. Pioneer can-
not now cure its legal inability to collect on the note 
by the cry of "fraud" where none exists. 
STEW ART, TOPHAM 
&HARDING 
714 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys at Law 
JUSTIN C. STEW ART 
714 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Appellants 
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